This document specifies integrity and replay protection for required implementation in the MANET Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) and the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2). This document specifies how an included integrity check value (ICV) and a timestamp TLV, defined in RFC6622bis, are used by NHDP and OLSRv2 for countering a number of security threats. The ICV TLV uses a SHA-256 based HMAC and one or more shared secret keys. The timestamp TLV is based on POSIX time, and assumes that the clocks in all routers in the network can be synchronized with sufficient precision. The mechanism in this specification can also be used for other MANET protocols using RFC5444.
This specification defines a framework of security mechanisms that must be included in conforming implementations of the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2) [OLSRv2] for Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs). A deployment of these protocols may choose to employ alternative(s) to these mechanisms, in particular it may choose to protect packets rather than messages, it may choose to use an alternative integrity check value (ICV) with preferred properties, and/or it may use an alternative timestamp. A deployment may choose to use no such security mechanisms, but this is not recommended.
The mechanisms specified are the use of an ICV for protection of the protocols' control messages, and the use of timestamps in those messages to prevent replay attacks. Both use the TLV mechanism specified in [RFC5444] to add this information to the messages. These ICV and timestamp TLVs are defined in [RFC6622bis] . Different ICV TLVs are used for HELLO messages in NHDP and TC messages in OLSRv2, the former also protecting the source address of the IP datagram that contains the HELLO message. This is because the IP datagram source address is used by NHDP to determine the address of a neighbor interface, and is not necessarily otherwise contained in the HELLO message, while OLSRv2's TC message is forwarded in a new packet, and thus has no single IP datagram source address.
The mechanism specified in this document exists between NHDP's and OLSRv2's message processing/generation and the [RFC5444] packet parsing/generation, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
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Implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST include this framework, and deployments of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] SHOULD use this framework, except for when a different security mechanism is more appropriate.
The applicability of this framework is determined by its characteristics, which are that it:
o Specifies a security framework that is required to be included in conforming implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] .
o Specifies an association of ICVs with messages, and for using missing or invalid ICVs as such an additional reason for rejecting a message as "badly formed and therefore invalid for processing". messages. (Note that in the case of NHDP, the packet protection is equally good, and also protects the packet header. In the case of OLSRv2, the packet protection has different properties than the message protection, especially for some forms of ICV. When packets contain more than one message, the packet protection has lower overheads in space and computation time.)
When a router generates a message on a MANET interface, this framework:
o Specifies how to calculate an integrity check value for the message.
o Specifies how to include that integrity check value using an ICV Message TLV.
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] allow for rejecting incoming messages prior to processing by NHDP or OLSRv2. This framework specifies that a message MUST be rejected if the ICV Message TLV is absent, or its value cannot be verified.
Parameters
This following router parameters are specified for use by the two protocols; the first is required only by NHDP, but may be visible to OLSRv2, the second is required only by OLSRv2:
o MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF -The maximum age that a HELLO message to be validated may have. If the current POSIX time of the router validating the HELLO message, minus the timestamp indicated in the TIMESTAMP TLV of the HELLO message, is greater than MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF, the HELLO message MUST be silently discarded.
o MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF -The maximum age that a TC message to be validated may have. If the current POSIX time of the router validating the TC message, minus the timestamp indicated in the TIMESTAMP TLV of the TC message, is greater than MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF, the TC message MUST be silently discarded.
The following constraints apply to these parameters: The second and fourth of those constraints assume ideal time synchronization of the clocks in all routers in the network. These bounds MAY be relaxed to allow for expected timing differences between routers (between neighboring routers for MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF). However it should also be noted that, in the ideal case, the parameters SHOULD be significantly less than those bounds.
Message Generation and Processing
This section specifies how messages are generated and processed by [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] when using this framework.
Message Content
Messages MUST have the content specified in [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] respectively. In addition, in order to conform to this framework, each message MUST contain:
o At least one ICV Message TLV (as specified in [RFC6622bis] ), generated according to Section 6.2. Implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST support the following version of the ICV TLV, but other versions MAY be used instead, or in addition, in a deployment, if more appropriate: The ICV Value MAY be truncated as specified in [RFC6622bis] [OLSRv2] ), the additional TLVs specified in Section 6.1 MUST (unless already present) be added to an outgoing message when using this framework.
The following processing steps (when using a single timestamp version and a single ICV algorithm) MUST be performed for a cryptographic algorithm that is used for generating an ICV for a message:
1. All ICV TLVs (if any) are temporarily removed from the message. Any temporarily removed ICV TLVs MUST be stored, in order to be reinserted into the message in step 5. The message size and Message TLV Block size are updated accordingly.
2. <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>, if present, are temporarily set to 0.
3. A TLV of type TIMESTAMP, as specified in Section 6.1, is added to the Message TLV Block. The message size and Message TLV block size are updated accordingly.
4. A TLV of type ICV, as specified in Section 6.1, is added to the Message TLV Block. The message size and Message TLV block size are updated accordingly.
5. All ICV TLVs that were temporary removed in step 1, are restored. The message size and Message TLV Block size are updated accordingly.
6. <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>, if present, are restored to their previous values.
An implementation MAY add either alternative TIMESTAMP and/or ICV TLVs, or more than one TIMESTAMP and/or ICV TLVs. All TIMESTAMP TLVs MUST be inserted before adding ICV TLVs. "On receiving a ... message, a router MUST first check if the message is invalid for processing by this router"
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] proceed to give a number of conditions that, each, will lead to a rejection of the message as "badly formed and therefore invalid for processing". When using a single timestamp version, and a single ICV algorithm, the following conditions to that list, each of which, if true, MUST cause NHDP or OLSRv2 (as appropriate) to consider the message as invalid for processing when using this framework: If a deployment chooses to use a different type extension from 1, appropriate measures MUST be taken to verify freshness of the message.
Validating a Message Based on Integrity Check
For an ICV Message TLV identified as described in Section 6.2:
1. All ICV Message TLVs (including the identified ICV Message TLV) are temporarily removed from the message, and the message size and Message TLV block size are updated accordingly.
2. The message's <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields are temporarily set to 0.
3. Calculate the integrity check value for the parameters specified in the identified ICV Message TLV, as specified in [RFC6622bis] .
4. If this integrity check value differs from the value of <ICV-data> in the ICV Message TLV, then the message validation fails. If the <ICV-data> has been truncated (as specified in [RFC6622bis] , the integrity check value calculated in the previous step MUST be truncated to the TLV length of the ICV Message TLV before comparing it with the <ICV-data>.
5. Otherwise, the message validation succeeds. The message's <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields are restored to their previous value, and the ICV Message TLVs are returned to the message, whose size is updated accordingly.
Provisioning of Routers
Before a router is able to generate ICVs or validate messages, it MUST acquire the shared secret key(s) to be used by all routers that are to participate in the network. This specification does not define how a router acquires secret keys.
IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document specifies a security framework for use with NHDP and OLSRv2 that allows for alleviating several security threats.
Alleviated Attacks
This section briefly summarizes security threats that are alleviated by the framework presented in this document.
9.1.1. Identity Spoofing
As only routers possessing the selected shared secret key are able to add a valid ICV TLV to a message, identity spoofing is countered.
Link Spoofing
Link spoofing is countered by the framework specified in this document, using the same argument as in Section 9.1.1.
Replay Attack
Replay attacks are partly countered by the framework specified in this document, but this depends on synchronized clocks of all routers in the MANET. An attacker that records messages to replay them later can only do so in the selected time interval after the timestamp that is contained in message. As an attacker cannot modify the content of this timestamp (as it is protected by the identity check value), an attacker cannot replay messages after this time. Within this time interval it is still possible to perform replay attacks, however the limits on the time interval are specified so that this will have a limited effect on the operation of the protocol.
Limitations
If no synchronized clocks are available in the MANET, replay attacks cannot be countered by the framework provided by this document. An alternative version of the TIMESTAMP TLV defined in [RFC6622bis] , with a monotonic sequence number, may have some partial value in this case, but will necessitate adding state to record observed message sequence number information.
The framework provided by this document does not avoid or detect security attacks by routers possessing the shared secret key that is used to generate integrity check values for messages.
This framework relies on an out-of-band protocol or mechanism for distributing the shared secret key(s) (and if an alternative
